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Laurence Cranmer 
 
Introduction  
 
In this paper I discuss some ideas about the nature of corporate responsibility. This is 
primarily a conceptual analysis. Some of the assumptions, problems and avenues for further 
research are clear to me, many others are not clear, and this is a work in progress.  
 
I start with a very wide claim: the idea that firms have some responsibility for the outcomes of 
their actions appeals to at least two widely held views.  
 
First, that these outcomes have an ethical significance that allows us to describe them as good 
and bad outcomes or a combination of both.   
 
Second, that we are in general responsible for the good and bad outcomes of actions that we 
intend or can reasonably foresee.  
 
I suggest the following working definition of ethical significance: outcomes that cause harm 
or benefit or a combination of both are ethically significant outcomes. The ideas of ‘harm’ 
and ‘benefit’ are informed by moral intuitions, moral principles or moral values. The status 
and content of these intuitions, principles and values will be contested. This working 
definition, in common with most definitions in ethics, is only partially adequate and 
potentially controversial. 
 
A working definition of responsibility includes the idea that the responsible agent may be 
called upon to refrain from acting, to mitigate the effects of the action, to compensate those 
adversely effected by the action, or in some cases be required to act. As with ethical 
significance, this working definition is only partially adequate.  
 
I suggest that these two widely held views are at the heart of the current debate about 
corporate social responsibility or CSR. 
 
One example of an implicit appeal to these two views is the UK Government definition of 
CSR. This is included on the Government CSR website csr.gov.uk. 
 
This definition focuses on the private sector and states that CSR:  
 takes into account the social, economic and environmental impacts of business activity - 
maximising the benefits and minimising the downside of the these activities 
 is over and above compliance to minimum legal requirements 
 involves voluntary arrangements 
 and, balances the competitive interests of business with the interests of wider society 
 
If we accept these two views about good and bad outcomes and responsibility as reasonable I 
suggest that this raises a series of complex issues for firms. I consider two of these issues.  
 
The first issue is: what is the extent of corporate responsibility for outcomes. As one route 
into this issue I suggest developing an extended view of value creation across supply chains 
and beyond. This view seeks to take into account the whole range of good and bad outcomes 
of business activity as a basis for analysing the extent of corporate responsibility.  
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The second issue is: firms are subject to public scrutiny for these outcomes. They may be 
called upon to give a public account of their activities and to set out publicly the actual extent 
of the responsibilities that they assume. This suggests that corporate responsibility is an 
aspect of public reason. One route into this issue is to sketch out whether and how an idea of 
public reason can provide an approach to considering the extent of corporate responsibility.  
 
Other issues that won’t be addressed directly, but which we can discuss, include: a discussion 
of what we mean by ethical significance in this context, including how we come to ascribe 
good and bad to outcomes; the ethical implications of intended and unintended outcomes; 
which persons or entities are responsible for the outcomes; how we assess the impact of the 
outcomes; how we account for the aggregated and cumulative effects of outcomes; and there 
are other questions.  
 
Value creation 
 
I first address the issue about the extent of corporate responsibility though proposing an 
extended view of value creation.  
 
A simple analysis of value creation is as follows: value is created by a firm through 
combining inputs with a transformation process to produce outputs.
2
 
 
We need to state an important assumption here: value is created under this definition by firms 
operating within minimum legal requirements.  
 
We can extend this beyond the firm through the analysis of supply chains which describe the 
flow of goods, services, information and finance etc from raw materials to end users to end of 
life and disposal.  
 
Although we may not be able to capture the full complexity of all the agents, connections and 
interrelationships through a supply chain we can expect to describe the essential connections.  
 
The idea of a ‘supply network’ may be a better way of modelling this flow and avoids the 
assumption that the flow is linear and unidirectional. This can be developed into a ‘value 
network’ or ‘value grid’. For this discussion I will continue to use the term ‘supply chain’.  
 
In a market situation we can measure value creation for an individual firm by financial 
indicators such as profit. On this measure value equals the financial revenue generated by 
outputs minus the financial cost of inputs and the transformation process.  
 
Value creation for an entire supply chain can also be measured by financial indicators, such as 
the combined long term return on investment for firms engaged in the supply chain.  
 
It has been pointed out to me that the idea of ‘value creation’ may be complemented, or in 
some cases replaced by, the idea of ‘value capture’. In this discussion I will continue to use 
the idea of value creation.  
 
Four dimensions of value  
 
We now have a useful set of ideas which enable us to analyse value creation for an individual 
firm, and potentially for a supply chain, that has an immediate utility for firms operating in a 
market.  
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This approach can be seen as the first, and potentially the second, of four dimensions of value.  
 
We can model these dimensions as overlaying each other, as illustrated Figure 1.  
 
We can describe the first dimension as narrow financial value. This uses financial 
measurement such as revenue from outputs minus the cost of inputs and a transformation 
process.  
 
We can extend this view to include longer term and wider ranging outcomes of a firm's 
activities such as the competitiveness and reputation of the supply chain. It is likely that these 
dimensions can also be given a financial value, although it may be more difficult to calculate 
accurately. We can describe this second dimension as wide financial value. 
 
These two dimensions may not capture all the financially measurable outcomes of a firm’s 
activities. We can describe a third dimension of value as financial externalities which are not 
usually accounted for by firms.  
 
However, these three financially measurable dimensions of value may not capture all of the 
outcomes of a firm’s activities. We can therefore describe a fourth dimension of non-financial 
value.  
As we move out from the centre of the diagram we move further from the boundary of an 
individual firm.  
 
These boundaries are not clear cut and will be determined by both formal considerations, for 
example, the legal structure of business organisations and accounting requirements and 
Narrow 
Financial 
Value
Wide Financial Value
Financial Externalities
Non-Financial Value
A - Boundary 
of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
supply chain?
C - Boundary of the 
immediate 
community and 
environment?
D - Widest boundary of the community 
and environment?
Figure 1: Four dimensions of value
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informal considerations, for example partnerships, supply chain integration and CSR policies 
themselves.  
 
We can describe the boundaries in the diagram as follows: 
 Boundary A is a possible boundary of the firm 
 Boundary B a possible boundary of the supply chain 
 Boundary C the wider community or environment effected by firm or supply chain 
externalities  
 Boundary D the outer limit of impacts on the widest view of the community for example 
global communities and, more speculatively, future generations and the environment for 
example biodiversity and atmospheric pollution 
 Boundary C and Boundary D  in particular may overlap 
 
The outcomes of a firm’s activities may create narrow financial value for the firm but may 
also create wider financial value for the supply chain, and financial externalities and non-
financial value for the wider community. The latter three may not, however, be accounted for 
or even be fully understood by the firm itself.  
 
Giving an account of narrow financial value is the most straightforward and most familiar. In 
this case we define the outcomes of a firms activities as relatively tangible products, 
comprising both good and services.  
 
We can then provide an overall financial measure of the value of these products using 
revenue minus cost as discussed above. 
 
I suggest that that this account involves at least two implicit ideas.  
 
Firstly, products pick out only part of the total outcomes of a firm's activities.  
 
Second, we replace an explicit appeal to good and bad outcomes with financial measurement 
of these products. We consider positive financial results such as profit or a competitive return 
on shareholder investment is a good outcome overall. We consider a financial loss as a bad 
outcome overall. The ethical significance of these results is implied by, or built into, the 
principles which underpin the institutional structure of the firm.   
 
The second dimension is wide financial value. This uses similar definitions as narrow 
financial value. We continue to consider products and to measure financial results, however 
these are now applied to the whole supply chain and may be more difficult to identify and 
attribute.  
 
Again, I suggest that products pick out only part of the outcomes of the supply chain, and 
financial results measure one aspect of these outcomes of supply chain activity.  
 
This becomes clearer when we consider the third dimension of financial externalities. In this 
case we continue to pick out relatively tangible outcomes, such as river pollution, but move 
beyond firm or supply chain products. The tangible nature of these outcomes makes it 
possible to assign a financial measure to these outcomes, for example loss of fish stocks and 
associated livelihoods resulting from river pollution.   
 
The boundary between financial externalities and the outcomes accounted for by firms or 
supply chains may not always be clear. In fact, these boundaries are of course subject to 
change, for example through legislation and regulation which may have the effect of 
internalising externalities.  
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When we consider the fourth dimension of non-financial value the appeal to tangible 
outcomes and financial measurement becomes problematic.  
 
Some outcomes which are not accounted for by firms, or supply chains or as financial 
externalities may be on the boundary between tangible and intangible outcomes.  
 
For example, it may be argued that atmospheric CO2 emissions contribute to global 
warming.
3
 This may be described as a non-financial outcome. However, CO2 emissions 
themselves are tangible outcomes. If global warming occurs as a result of these emissions it 
may, in principle, be possible to measure the effect of this warming financially. This may 
result in CO2 being considered a financial externality. Arguably, this is starting to happen. 
 
An outcome such as the aesthetic loss of an area of natural beauty as a result of oil 
exploration is an intangible outcome for which it is difficult or impossible to assign a 
financial value. A proxy financial measure such as an assumed ‘willingness to pay’ for the 
area of natural beauty may be attempted. For example, an actual or assumed fee to access the 
area or a level of taxation to protect it.   
 
I suggest that in these cases we tend to appeal directly to the idea that this is a bad outcome. 
This in turn appeals to the ethical significance we give to the aesthetic value of the area of 
natural beauty.  
 
We can also consider non-financial good outcomes of a firm’s activity such as the satisfaction 
derived from an individual fulfilling their potential as an oil exploration engineer, to use the 
same example.  
 
I suggest that the four dimensions of value approach makes it possible to take into account all 
the outcomes of the firms activities and defines value in terms of the ethical significance of 
these outcomes. This allows us to describe outcomes as good and bad outcomes or a 
combination of both.  
 
The products of a firm are considered part of the total outcomes. The financial results of the 
firm are considered an implicit measure of the ethical significance of this group of outcomes. 
 
It may be possible in principle to assess whether the total value created by the firm is positive 
or negative. This will be based in the total balance of good and bad outcomes resulting from 
the firm’s activities.   
 
Defining and agreeing the nature, scope, attribution and ethical significance of all outcomes 
makes this assessment problematic. I suggest that the four dimensions of value approach can 
be used even if a final view of total value is not possible.  
 
Ideas of social accounting, the ‘triple bottom line’ of economic, social and environmental 
performance, and CSR reporting and auditing can be seen as attempts to take the full range of 
outcomes and the total value created by the firm into account. 
 
Public sector value creation 
 
This discussion concentrates primarily on value creation by firms operating in markets. 
However, we can use the four dimensions of value approach to describe a possible boundary 
E for a public sector organisation, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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In general public sector value creation is not measurable by narrow or wide financial value 
and typically delivers non-financial value and regulates financial externalities. The 
public/private sector boundary may be seen as reflecting a societal ‘division of labour’.  
 
Firms operating in markets are motivated to create narrow financial value. Governments 
create a legal and policy framework to regulate the market which enables firms to operate 
effectively to create financial value. This framework itself is based on the primarily non-
financial value of effective markets.  
 
Just one example of an attempt to develop a means of measuring non-financial value in the 
public sector is the idea of a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) to measure health 
interventions.
4
  
 
I will not discuss public sector value creation further here, but we may wish to pick this up in 
the discussion.  
 
Minimal and maximal views of corporate responsibility  
 
I suggest that we can use the four dimensions of value to analysis the spectrum of views about 
the nature and scope of corporate responsibility. We can describe each end of this spectrum as 
                                                 
4
 The idea of QALY and other aspects of public sector value creation require further work beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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Figure 2: Public sector value creation
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a minimal and a maximal view of corporate responsibility with a range of options along the 
spectrum. This is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
A minimal view suggests that firms discharge their corporate responsibilities by achieving 
positive financial results, and operating within minimum legal requirements. This reflects a 
narrow financial view of value.  
 
A maximal view proposes that firms take a wider view of corporate responsibility beyond 
financial results and minimum legal requirements. This reflects all four dimensions of value.  
 
Minimal views may be justified as a part of the societal ‘division of labour’ across the private 
and public sectors. On this view, extending corporate responsibility undermines the efficient 
operation of markets and dilutes clear accountabilities such as providing a return on 
shareholder investment.  
 
It may also be argued that markets are in fact the best means of resolving many of the issues 
raised by the analysis of corporate responsibility. A wider discussion of the efficiency of 
markets is required to explore this further. For example, we may ask how far markets capture 
long term preferences which are not reflected in short or medium term financial decisions. 
 
Maximal views may be taken by campaigning groups such as environmental pressure groups. 
A key argument here is that the scope, impact and significance of global business activity is 
so great that the outcomes of this activity cannot be regulated by government alone. 
 
When we consider the minimal-maximal spectrum it may be argued that in a market situation 
all business activity must in fact operate within a minimal view of corporate responsibility. 
Narrow 
Financial 
Value
Wide Financial Value
Financial Externalities
Non-Financial Value
A - Boundary 
of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
supply chain?
C - Boundary of the 
immediate community 
and environment?
D - Widest boundary of the community and 
environment?
E – Boundary of a 
public sector 
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Maximal view of 
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Minimal view 
of corporate 
responsibility
Figure 3: Minimal and maximal spectrum of corporate responsibility
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All business activity must ultimately contribute to narrow financial value in the short, 
medium or long term for the firm to survive.  
 
On this view the four outcomes identified by the second, third and fourth dimensions provide 
a description of outcomes which a firm may need or may seek to internalise in the future.  
 
For example, the market for Fairtrade or organic products provided a clear business 
opportunity for firms. The nature of these products appealed to aspects of ‘non-financial 
value’ which have gradually been expressed as preferences by consumers and provide an 
opportunity for ‘narrow financial value’ through meeting these preferences.  
 
A further example is the ‘non-financial aesthetic value’ of an area of natural beauty 
mentioned before. Where an oil exploration firm takes this into account, it may have assessed 
the financial implications of a bad environmental reputation in the future and acted to 
mitigate, compensate or prevent the damage in order to limit this bad reputation. This 
assumes that reputation will have a tangible impact on the creation of narrow financial value.  
 
The minimal view of corporate responsibility suggests that the four dimensions of value maps 
out further potential sources of value creation for the firm. It may be argued that in a market 
situation, firms can only rationally pursue these sources of potential value if they can be made 
to yield narrow financial value.  
 
Any move beyond the minimal view suggests that firms have a responsibility for good and 
bad outcomes beyond those accounted for by narrow financial value.  
 
The empirical issue here is whether there are examples of firms taking on these aspects of 
responsibility. We can ask whether any firm has in fact formed a strategic intention which 
takes into account outcomes for which there is no financial return, even in the very long term.  
 
The conceptual issue is whether the debate about corporate responsibility is in the process of 
extending the range of outcomes which firms should take into account. On this view, firms 
may now define their primary responsibilities as achieving positive financial results, 
operating within the law and taking into account a specified group of outcomes in addition to 
those covered by the first two responsibilities. 
 
For example, a firm may consider that a certain level of working conditions of employees in 
sub-contractor firms within its supply chain is a responsibility as such. For this to be more 
than a minimal responsibility it would have to be fully or at least partially distinct from any 
instrumental financial benefit or legal requirements.  
 
We can also use the minimal-maximal spectrum to consider examples of how the debate 
about extending corporate responsibilities may have an effect on firms, even though the basic 
business model remains one of minimal responsibility and narrow financial value. I make five 
suggestions here.  
 
First, we may distinguish between the intentions an individual has for setting up a business, 
and the market and legal situation within which that business must survive and flourish. We 
may find that these intentions are increasingly informed by an extended view of corporate 
responsibility. This view of responsibility may in part determine the core business 
proposition, such as developing renewable sources of energy, or aspects of the way in which 
the individual intends the business to operate, such as ensuring a certain level of working 
conditions across the supply chain. 
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Once the business is established it may only survive if it can translate these original intentions 
into narrow financial value. However, it may be argued that an extended view of corporate 
responsibility has introduced or encouraged these intentions in the market.  
 
Second, the argument that firms use a wide view of stakeholder value in addition to 
shareholder value as a measure of success. Stakeholders include employees, suppliers, 
customers, the community affected by the firm and, in some views, minority shareholders 
who are contrasted with majority and institutional shareholders. 
 
The idea of stakeholder value takes into account outcomes described by the second, third and 
fourth dimensions of value. An important empirical issue here is whether firms that take 
stakeholder value into account achieve even marginally better financial results than firms that 
focus on narrower shareholder value.  
 
If the evidence supports better financial results then this may be used by firms to develop a 
business case for taking these wider outcomes into account. It also suggests that stakeholder 
value has become part of achieving shareholder value, and can be described by the first 
narrow financial dimension of value. 
 
However, as with the idea of initial business intentions, it may be argued that this process 
nevertheless has the effect of changing the outcomes which a firm takes into account to 
achieve narrow financial value, even if the underlying business model remains the same. 
 
A third example concerns the nature of shareholder value itself. It may be argued that the 
idea of narrow financial value assumes that shareholders themselves always prioritise 
financial value. If shareholders make investment decisions which include other dimensions of 
value and are prepared to forego financial value this may have the effect of changing the 
outcomes which a firm takes into account. 
 
One implication of this could be that the value of a firm to shareholders, reflected in its share 
price, is determined in part by the firm pursuing outcomes in addition to those that yield 
financial value. The value of the firm continues to be measured in the market in financial 
terms but the means by which that value is created may have extended along the minimal-
maximal spectrum. This requires further analysis, including an analysis of private equity as a 
form of ownership. 
 
As with stakeholder value, this would be an interesting effect even if it only had a marginal 
impact.  
 
A fourth example is more speculative again. It could be argued that if it is difficult to predict 
with complete accuracy how current decisions will affect long or very long term shareholder 
value, this suggests that there is a degree of choice involved in a firm making long term 
decisions. In this case the debate about extending corporate responsibility may influence these 
decisions in the absence of clear cut information about financial value, even where the 
decision making process is based on the overall expectation of long term financial value.  
 
A fifth example I want to mention is the way in which firms interpret legal requirements. A 
firm may take on the responsibility for fully complying with all legislation across areas such 
as corporate governance, employment law, health & safety and environmental protection. 
This may be complex and difficult to achieve. The intentions of the firm may be motivated in 
part at least by an extended view of corporate responsibility. Even though this does not 
formally extend corporate responsibility beyond legal requirements it may in practice extend 
corporate responsibility for a firm compared to its competitors and peers.  
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Further, where a firm operates globally it may decide to apply the most stringent national 
legislation and regulation applicable to various areas of activity across all of its global 
operations. Again this may have the effect of exceeding national legal requirements in some 
cases, and this may be seen as an example of extending corporate responsibility in an 
important sense. 
 
The changing boundaries of the four dimensions 
 
The discussion of maximal and minimal corporate responsibility suggests that the boundaries 
between the four dimensions are unlikely to remain static.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 4 by the example of the changing boundary of narrow financial 
value which represents a possible boundary for the firm. 
 
This boundary may expand or contract to reflect:  
 the changing requirements of customers and investors 
 compliance to new legislation and regulation 
 the desire to enhance reputation 
 cost reduction opportunities, for example reducing fuel consumption which also reduces 
CO2 emissions 
 and, revenue opportunities, for example the marketing of ‘green products’   
 
In each case outcomes which were previously aspects of ‘wide financial value’, ‘financial 
externalities’ or ‘non-financial value’ have become outcomes which yield, or which cease to 
yield, ‘narrow financial value’. 
Narrow 
Financial 
Value
Wide Financial Value
Financial Externalities
Non-Financial Value
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of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
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Changes in 
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legislation and 
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Figure 4: Changes to the boundaries of the four dimensions
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The other boundaries may also of course change. For example, we may argue that the 
boundary of non-financial value has extended outwards as the ethical significance we ascribe 
to the environment and the natural world has changed.  
 
Corporate responsibility, public scrutiny and public reason 
 
The four dimensions of value approach and the minimal-maximal spectrum may help to map 
out the potential extent of corporate responsibility for the good and bad outcomes of a firm’s 
activities. I want now to consider the second issue suggested at the start of this talk.   
 
To restate this issue: firms are subject to public scrutiny for outcomes across the four 
dimensions of value. They may be called upon to give a public account of their activities and 
to set out publicly the actual extent of the responsibilities they assume and for which they 
accept accountability.  
 
In particular, firms may be expected to state where they stand on CSR, including through 
CSR targets, reports and audits. Using the analysis so far, this may be described as stating 
where they position themselves along the minimal-maximal spectrum of corporate 
responsibility.   
 
All of this may suggest that corporate responsibility is an aspect of public reason. One route 
into this issue is to sketch out whether and how an idea of public reason can provide an 
approach to considering these issues. 
 
I suggest the dimensions of a working definition of public reason. For each dimension we can 
ask whether this applies to the debate about corporate responsibility. If so, we can begin to 
consider how each dimension might help to give a shape this debate.  
 
I suggest the following dimensions of a working definition, drawing on the ideas of John 
Rawls.
5
  
 
 The content of public reason is matters of public concern 
 
 Public reason engages the reason of citizens.  
 
 Public reason describes the terms of debate for citizens either seeking or holding public 
office. Public reason may also provide the terms of debate on matters of public concern 
for all citizens as if they were seeking or holding public office.   
 
 Public reason as an activity is held in the public domain.  
 
 Matters of public concern involve issues of basic justice 
 
 Public reason aspires to use arguments that all citizens can reasonably accept. In 
particular, public reason seeks to avoid the explicit appeal to comprehensive doctrines 
which typically involve fundamental moral or philosophical claims about which citizens 
may reasonably disagree. This is one of the implications of pluralism. It is one of the most 
complex aspects of any definition of public reason.  
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The Idea of Public Reason Revisited in The Law of Peoples, Harvard, 1999 
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 It is expected that while citizens will disagree about these arguments, it is also possible in 
public reason to arrive at an overlapping consensus on matters of public concern, even if 
this consensus is based on the procedure for achieving agreement while accepting 
substantive disagreement about the issues themselves.  
 
 It is expected that in public reason citizens can give a reasonable and explicit account to 
each other of their judgements on matters of public concern, if called upon to do so. One 
way of thinking about this idea is for citizens to imagine that they are investigating, 
debating and forming judgements about matters of public concern in the public sphere of 
a democratic parliament.  
 
 Public reason may be distinguished from private reason. It is important to make this 
distinction, in part to allow for citizens to exercise fully their freedoms of thought, 
expression and action.  
 
 Finally, the idea of public reason may require the assumptions, background conditions 
and institutional arrangements of a liberal democratic political society. This presents a 
particular problem if public reason is applied to political societies which are not liberal 
democratic, or where the political nature of that society is contested, or to issues of global 
public concern.  
 
I think all of these dimensions raise interesting questions for corporate responsibility. I briefly 
discuss three dimensions. These cover the ideas of ‘matters of public concern’, ‘the reason of 
citizens’ and ‘public office’. We can discuss other dimensions later. 
 
Matters of public concern 
 
To take the first dimension: is corporate responsibility ‘a matter of public concern’. 
 
Many of the types of issue that arise in debates about corporate responsibility do seem to be 
matters of public concern. This applies to specific issues and to wider concerns about the 
scope and limits of corporate responsibility. 
 
Specific issues include the direct environmental impacts of a firm’s activities, the fair 
treatment of employees, the fair treatment of suppliers, and the effect of the firm’s products 
on consumers of these products. This can be described as a first level of public concern. 
 
These issues raise wider concerns about the indirect responsibility of firm’s for the supply 
chains of which they are a part and the communities and countries in which they operate. This 
is a second level of concern. 
 
This combination of specific and wider issues suggest higher level concerns about the proper 
distribution of responsibility for these matters between companies, national governments, 
international regulatory bodies, non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, employees, 
investors, consumers and citizens. This is a third level of concern.  
 
One way to assess whether on this criterion corporate responsibility is an aspect of public 
reason is to ask an empirical question about whether citizens do, in fact, consider these issues 
in this way. This requires full and proper investigation which might include the level of 
coverage and debate on these issues in the media, the degree of participation in pressure 
group activity, the number and extent of public demonstrations, and the influence of these 
issues on voting intentions.  
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We can also compare issues of corporate responsibility with other issues which are already 
widely considered to be matters of public concern. Environment impacts, climate change, 
global working conditions, and obesity as a result of consuming certain products may qualify 
as matters of public concern.  
 
I suggest that there does seem to be public concern about the first and second levels and to 
some extent at least about the third level. 
 
The reason of citizens 
 
To take the second dimension: does corporate responsibility engage the reason of citizens  
 
Reason may be described as a person’s intellectual and moral capacity to review potentially 
complex matters, to think through the factual and ethical issues at stake, and, in many cases, 
to form a judgement as a basis for action.   
 
Corporate responsibility does seem to raise issues which people worry about, try to think 
through, argue with each other about, try to weigh up the facts and the ethical issues, form 
judgements and, in some cases, take various forms of action.  
 
As in the discussion of matters of public concern, this appeals to an empirical claim that 
people do, in fact, exercise their reason on these issues.  
 
Reasoning about matters of public concern suggests the idea of a citizen. This includes the 
idea of shared responsibility for a matter, and the idea of a duty towards fellow citizens to 
form a view and, possibly, to take action.  
 
We typically understand citizenship as membership of a particular form of political 
association involving certain obligations, rights, responsibilities and duties.  
 
Firms may also be described a form of association. Persons who make up this association take 
on a further set of obligations, responsibilities, rights and duties. These will range widely in 
scope and depth depending on a person’s role within the firm. They may be described legally 
as part of a contract of employment and, in the case of employers, responsibilities for 
managing a company.  
 
Unlike citizenship, membership of firms is voluntary, although there is an interesting question 
about the practical freedom for individuals to opt out of employment by any firm or other 
organisation. 
 
The responsibilities of firm membership can be seen as contained within the higher level 
responsibilities of citizenship.  
 
In particular, citizens are bound by the rule of law. The responsibilities of firm membership 
cannot override the rule of law, as this is usually understood. However, both roles include 
many informal responsibilities which are not bound by law. We may then ask what the 
balance is between these informal responsibilities, in particular on the issue of corporate 
responsibility.  
 
One view could be that the concern of citizens about issues of corporate responsibility is 
entirely distinct from their informal responsibilities as members of firms, as long as these 
latter responsibilities are bound by the rule of law.  
 
For example, it may be argued that the view I may take about corporate responsibility has no 
direct implications for my role in a firm. This does not mean that the subject matter may not 
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overlap. It does means that any implications for my role in a firm comes through the debate 
on this matter amongst all citizens, for example in the form a voluntary policy adopted by the 
firm of which I am a part. This distinction may apply even if I am the Chief Executive of a 
major company who is, at the same time, directly involved in the public debate about 
corporate responsibility.  
 
This view is reflected in a person making clear from which role they are arguing when they 
make a statement about an issue of corporate responsibility. They may say, for example, ‘as a 
citizen I think A, but in my role as a company manager I will actually act on the basis of B’.  
 
An objection to this view may be that the responsibilities of citizenship are of a higher order 
and should be considered as primary. If we exclude our role within a company from these 
responsibilities we have significantly, and perhaps unacceptably, reduced the significance of 
citizenship. 
 
This view may in turn be reflected in a person overlapping the two roles. For example, I may 
say, ‘although the commercial argument up to now has been to do A, my sense of 
responsibility as a citizen suggests that I should do B. In this case I will act on B in my role as 
a company manager’. 
 
An objection here is to argue that responsibilities towards shareholders to make commercially 
sound decisions have been compromised. In addition, this responsibility to shareholders may 
be seen as primary, on the basis that a central responsibility of citizenship is to exercise 
particular responsibilities fully, in this case those of a company manager.  
 
Public office 
 
To take the third dimension: can we describe the roles and positions within a firm as public 
offices. 
 
The idea of public office typically applies to Members of Parliaments, senior judges and 
senior members of public institutions such as police commissioners.  
 
The definition of public office needs to be considered carefully. 
 
A narrow definition of public office would restrict the definition to roles which are central to, 
and shape, democratic, constitutional and legal arrangements. This may be extended further to 
include roles such as Senior Civil Servants involved in the administration and management of 
these arrangements.  
 
Chief Executives and Board Members of firms are roles which have significant responsibility. 
Much of this responsibility is defined by and bound by a range of legal considerations.  
 
It may be argued that firms operate within the constitutional framework rather than shaping it. 
Roles in firms may therefore be considered private roles, rather than public offices, albeit 
with significant responsibilities. These roles may be bound by an idea of private rather than 
public reason.  
 
A wide definition of public office would include roles which have a significant public 
responsibility.  
 
For example, the Chief Executive of a public company has a responsibility to increase, or at 
least maintain, the financial value of shareholder investment. This is a public responsibility, 
since it applies widely to individuals and institutions who freely invest in the firm.  
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This suggests that Chief Executives do hold a public office, at least with regard to their 
responsibility towards shareholders. There may be other responsibilities which are part of the 
private business of the company.  
 
A wide definition of public office may also include roles which have a significant impact on 
citizens through the outcomes of decisions made by holders of these roles. This impact may 
be difficult to define accurately. The Chief Executive of a public company is likely to take 
decisions that have an impact on citizens beyond shareholders. These may be described using 
the ‘four dimensions of value’ model. These impacts are typical of the second, third and 
fourth dimensions.  
 
I want to conclude this discussion of public reason at this point. This has sketched out a 
working definition and then started to consider some of the applications of some of the 
dimensions of this working definition to the debate about corporate responsibility.  
 
Concluding suggestions 
 
Finally, I make some concluding suggestions based on the analysis so far.  
 
The four dimensions of value analysis seeks to map out the full range of good and bad 
outcomes of a firm's activities. On this basis, the minimal-maximal spectrum seeks to map out 
the extent of corporate responsibility for these outcomes.  
 
I suggest that this is a descriptive analysis and remains impartial on where along this 
spectrum corporate responsibility lies.  
 
However, the idea of good and bad outcomes appeals to the idea that these outcomes have an 
ethical significance. This suggests that there are hard ethical questions about responsibility 
which need to be addressed. 
 
As with all ethical questions there is no simple way to answer these questions. 
 
We can describe the ethical and practical problem of corporate responsibility using the 
minimal-maximal spectrum.  
 
For firms, realising narrow financial value is based on a series of implicit claims about ethical 
significance which underpin the institutional structure of the firm. This is consistent with a 
minimal view of corporate responsibility.   
 
For some citizens this may not be sufficient. The public scrutiny of the wider outcomes of a 
firms activities, described by the second, third and fourth dimensions of value, may suggest 
an extended view of corporate responsibility, including a maximal view in some cases. This 
makes an explicit appeal to claims about ethical significance, and the identification of good 
and bad outcomes.  
 
Firms may respond to this scrutiny by seeking to extend their view of corporate responsibility. 
However, in a market situation this extension may only be possible if it yields narrow 
financial value in the long term.  
 
Governments may also, of course, respond to the public scrutiny of firms through policy, 
legislation and regulation.  
 
The idea of public reason may provide a way of understanding this debate.  
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It may be argued that corporate responsibility is not directly a matter of public reason. In this 
case, firms make a series of private decisions, within a wider context of public policy and 
legal requirements which, it may be argued, are subject to public reason.  
 
Alternatively, it may be argued that corporate responsibility is a matter of public reason, using 
the working definition. This may make sense of the idea that firms and citizens are engaged in 
a direct debate about the hard ethical questions of responsibility. In this case, public reason 
may provide a basis for understanding the terms of this debate and the manner in which it is 
conducted.  
 
I hope that the ideas considered here form the basis for further discussion. This is a work in 
progress.  
 
